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Abstract 
Organizations appear to implement blockchain solutions based on fear of missing out 
instead of a clear understanding of blockchain usefulness. Actually, ninety percent of 
current blockchain projects do not need a blockchain to meet their requirements. 
Therefore, we employ a Design Science Research approach to develop a framework for 
evaluation of blockchain implementations. The framework incorporates common factors 
of blockchain decisions, including blockchain innovation, blockchain design, inter-
organizational integration, and implementation environment. We contribute to the 
scientific literature by structuring previous research efforts in a four-step framework, 
which provides a fruitful ground for future conceptual and empirical studies. For 
practitioners, the framework is useful to identify blockchain projects that facilitate 
purposeful blockchain adoption. 
Keywords:  Blockchain, distributed ledger technology, Bitcoin 
Introduction 
Blockchain is an intriguing technology that promises to transform agreements, processes, businesses, and 
financial models into digital code that is stored and shared in immutable, distributed ledgers, and identified 
and validated by cryptographic signatures (Beck et al., 2016). Blockchain may redefine companies and 
economies by relying on distributed networks of users, which can change enterprise architectures and affect 
the ways companies generate value. At least one innovative blockchain-based business is expected to be 
worth $10 billion by 2022 and the value may grow to $3.1 trillion by 2030 (Furlonger and Valdes, 2017).  
Organizations have an interest in blockchains to reduce costs, accelerate existing processes, facilitate data 
exchange with partners, and achieve new revenue sources. However, current blockchain implementations 
are often motivated by fear of missing out instead of an understanding of blockchain usefulness (Furlonger 
and Valdes, 2017). As with many projects based on new technologies, blockchain projects are motivated by 
political problems within organizations (e.g., how to satisfy a chief executive officer) or aim to improve the 
image of a company. The long-term business value of blockchains often remains an afterthought. As a result, 
ninety percent of current blockchain projects either do not need blockchains to meet their requirements or 
result in blockchain solutions not suitable for implementation in their current IT infrastructure (Furlonger 
and Valdes, 2017). 
Blockchain design components and business outcomes differ from traditional technologies and business 
models because the infrastructure is decentralized and relies on peer-to-peer information exchange, 
business value is collectively generated by nodes, and cooperation on intra- and inter-organizational levels 
is required to fully leverage the technology (Beck and Müller-Bloch, 2017). For blockchains to be 
implemented in existing ecosystems, many factors of IT infrastructure, inter-organizational governance, 
and societal interactions should be considered simultaneously (Glaser, 2017). For example, the application 
of blockchains requires the consideration of technical blockchain limitations (e.g., delay in recording 
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transactions) and performance metrics of different blockchain designs (Walsh et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2017). 
At the same time, the requirements of interoperability of blockchains with other systems, user behavior, 
and regulations can affect the outcomes of blockchain projects (Peters, Panayi and Chapelle, 2015; Schlegel, 
Zavolokina and Schwabe, 2018). Further, blockchain integration and the interconnection between nodes 
are not limited to one organization but require inter-organizational collaboration (Fridgen, Schweizer, 
Regner and Urbach, 2018; Oliveira et al., 2018). The absence of a holistic framework to evaluate blockchain 
implementations leads to misunderstandings of the core purposes of blockchains, mismatches between 
blockchain design components, failures in interoperability with existing IT solutions, and confusions 
regarding future visions of technology (Furlonger and Valdes, 2017). 
In the context of this debate, the objective of the manuscript is to gather technical and managerial 
knowledge of blockchains and operationalize them in a framework for evaluation of blockchain 
implementations. We answer the research question: What are the common factors of blockchain decisions 
to evaluate blockchain implementations and how do these factors interconnect with each other? 
This study follows a Design Science Research (DSR) approach (Hevner, March, Park and Ram, 2004). For 
data collection, we use the scientific literature that helps us to arrive at a set of blockchain evaluation factors. 
Based on IT artifacts in the blockchain domain, we organize the resulting factors in a framework for 
evaluation of blockchain implementations with four semantic categories: blockchain innovation, 
blockchain design, inter-organizational integration, and implementation environment. We evaluate the 
framework by interviewing experts and showcase the applicability of the framework on the Brooklyn 
Microgrid project (Lacity, 2018; Mengelkamp et al., 2018). 
The study contributes to the scientific literature by synthesizing and operationalizing previous research 
efforts in a framework for evaluation of blockchain implementations. Besides, the framework by itself is a 
contribution of the manuscript. Practitioners can use the framework to understand the main factors of 
success or failure of blockchain implementations beforehand.  
We structure the manuscript as follows. We start with a blockchain background and highlight the 
importance of DSR for the blockchain domain. Next, we outline our DSR methodology. Then, we present 
the developed framework. Further, we showcase the applicability of the framework on the Brooklyn 
Microgrid project. Then, we discuss principal findings, implications for theory and practice, limitations of 
our study, and areas for future research. We conclude the paper with a brief outline. 
Blockchain Background 
Blockchain was introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 as the Bitcoin blockchain — a common 
transparent, global, and openly-accessible asset ledger that keeps the history of financial transactions 
between members of a decentralized peer-to-peer network (Nakamoto, 2008). Over time, other blockchain 
types emerged that differ in approaches to blockchain governance (Table 1).  
Public permissionless (Bitcoin) blockchains are fully decentralized blockchains where everyone can read, 
write, and validate information (Beck, Müller-Bloch and King, 2018). Such blockchains are useful for 
applications with a large number of untrusted participants where no restriction on access and no 
authentication for validation are required. Public permissionless blockchains require proof-of-work 
consensus mechanisms or proof-of-stake consensus mechanisms to achieve agreements on system updates. 
Application examples are cryptocurrencies, where participants do not have to trust each other but the 
blockchain itself (Nakamoto, 2008). 
Public permissioned blockchains are more centralized blockchains, where only authenticated and pre-
defined users can read and write transactions. However, all nodes in the network participate in consensus 
finding. Participants determine consensus mechanisms. Organizations consortia (e.g., Ripple) are examples 
of public permissioned blockchains, where pre-defined nodes in the network are trustful organizations and 
deal directly with each other to support a peer-to-peer transaction exchange (Walsh et al., 2016). 
Private permissioned blockchains are fully centralized blockchains where access authorization does not 
entail validation permissions, which require additional authorization rights usually given only to a small 
number of nodes. The nodes that have been authorized to read the data, also need to be authorized to 
broadcast transactions. In private permissioned blockchains, several highly trusted nodes participate in 
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consensus finding (e.g., practical Byzantine fault tolerance) based on resource-saving. Usually, enterprises 
employ private permissioned blockchains (e.g., Hyperledger) for their implementations. 
Private permissionless blockchains are not applicable. Applications are not identified (Beck et al., 2018). 
Table 1. Blockchain Types 
Blockchain Types Description Applications 
Public Permissionless 
Blockchains 
Everyone can read, write, and validate the information. 
The consensus is enforced by proof-of-work or proof-of-
stake. Users are usually anonymous and pseudonymous. 
Cryptocurrencies 
(Bitcoin) 
Public Permissioned 
Blockchains 
Only authenticated and pre-defined users can read and 
write transactions. All nodes participate in consensus 
finding. Identifiable nodes determine consensus 
mechanisms. 
Organizational 
consortia (Ripple, 
R3) 
Private Permissioned 
Blockchains 
Access authorization does not entail validation 
permissions, which require additional authorization 
rights given to several nodes. Consensus (e.g., practical 
Byzantine fault tolerance) is enforced by trustful nodes. 
Enterprise projects 
(Hyperledger) 
Table 1. Blockchain Types 
Taxonomies and topologies classify other blockchain design components including tokens, oracles, and 
programming languages. For the sake of brevity, we refer to Glaser and Bezzenberger (2015), Xu et al., 
(2017), Oliveira, Zavolokina, Bauer and Schwabe (2018), Tönnissen and Teuteberg (2018), and Labazova et 
al., (2019) for a more elaborated description of blockchain design components.   
Design Science Research in the Blockchain Domain 
In the last years, interest in blockchain moved far beyond Bitcoin. The financial sector and other sectors 
investigate blockchain proofs-of-concept prototypes. For example, a blockchain prototype for financial 
transactions can replace a trust-based coffee shop payment solution (Beck et al., 2016). Automatic 
execution of blockchain-based financial contracts can move from natural languages towards formal 
languages of smart contracts (Elsman, Egelund-mu, Henglein and Ross, 2017). Cross-organizational 
workflow management in a German bank case can run on blockchains (Fridgen, Radszuwill, Urbach and 
Utz, 2018). Besides, blockchain prototypes can reduce costs of know-your-customer verification processes 
and revolutionize loyalty programs (Wang, Luo and Xue, 2018). In the public sector, blockchain prototypes 
aim to overcome the double taxation of investors on dividend payment and move land records from paper 
to blockchain (Hyvärinen, Risius and Friis, 2017). Public healthcare can benefit from managing medical 
records on blockchains, improve precision healthcare, and audit the healthcare value chain to improve 
patient outcomes. For the energy sector, the most investigated implementation is an electric vehicle and 
their integration into microgrids (Albrecht et al., 2018; Hua et al., 2018; Lacity, 2018; Mengelkamp et al., 
2018). Logistic explores the prototype to turn central documents in shipping (e.g., the Bill of Lading) into 
smart contracts on blockchains (Naerland, Müller-Bloch, Beck and Palmund, 2017). Other blockchain 
proofs-of-concept enable the automated transaction of real-world assets such as diamonds (Notheisen, 
Cholewa and Shanmugam, 2017; Loebbecke, Lueneborg and Niederle, 2018). For social businesses, 
blockchain is a basic technology of crowdlending platforms and social networking practices (Schweizer et 
al., 2017; Ciriello, Beck and Thatcher, 2018). 
Different from particular proofs-of-concept, conceptual frameworks guide the integration of blockchain 
implementations in industries and markets. The core idea of the proposed frameworks is the focus on 
multiple layers of blockchain technology and its environment (Glaser, 2017). For example, the blockchain 
market engineering approach introduces macro elements of blockchain-based platforms and surrounding 
factors (e.g., legal, social and economic constraints) that is a basic macro layer for the infrastructure layer 
(Notheisen, Hawlitschek and Weinhardt, 2017). The infrastructure layer implements the blockchain 
protocol that specifies the basic elements of blockchain system designs including distributed database, 
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consensus mechanism, and cryptographic protocol. The infrastructure layer, in its turn, influences 
application logic of implementations and is the foundation of the microeconomic design. Based on these 
realized applications, one can analyze the social factors and individual user behavior in decentralized 
networks. 
Other process-based tools investigate dynamics of blockchain implementation (Beck and Müller-Bloch, 
2017; Albrecht et al., 2018) or propose methods for developing blockchain use cases (Fridgen, Radszuwill, 
Rieger and Urbach, 2018). Topologies and classifications of the blockchain-related concepts (e.g., 
cryptocurrencies) investigate the factors of the affected markets, such as the potential for disruption and 
competitive pressure (Kazan, Tan and Lim, 2014). Ontologies and typologies of blockchain business 
networks formalize the concepts and properties to describe the integral parts of blockchain business models 
and values (Rückeshäuser, 2017; Seebacher, 2018). Managerial studies derive sets of business factors for 
implementing blockchains (Lacity, 2018; Mengelkamp et al., 2018). Also, there are classifications of new 
blockchain-caused phenomena, for example, Tokenomics (Fridgen, Schweizer, Regner and Urbach, 2018; 
Oliveira et al., 2018). Different frameworks of governance in the blockchain economy and decentralized 
autonomous organizations (DAO) arouse interest (Beck et al., 2018; Ziolkowski, Miscione and Schwabe, 
2018). For the detailed description, we refer to the original research projects. 
Methodology 
This study follows a Design Science Research approach that guides developing IT artifacts and their use in 
practice (Hevner et al., 2004; Peffes, Tuunanen, Rothenberger and Chatterjee, 2008). Developing IT 
artifacts should be relevant to the domain of interest and grounded in the previous knowledge base, while 
the design and evaluation of the solution happen iteratively. To develop a framework for evaluation of 
blockchain implementations, we achieved relevance with investigating shortcomings of blockchain 
implementations and rigor with knowledge of blockchain technology, best practice of real-world blockchain 
implementations, and IT artifacts in the blockchain domain. To strengthen the quality of our artifact, we 
utilized DSR methodology for information systems research (Peffers et al., 2008), which comprises six 
steps: problem identification, objective definition, design and development, demonstration, evaluation, and 
communication (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Problem identification. The blockchain domain is at an early stage of development and is concerned 
with a lack of defined tools to guide evaluation of blockchain implementations. That results in a high 
number of unsuccessful blockchain implementations (Labazova et al., 2019). 
Objective definition. To explore the potential use of our framework, we asked experts in casual talks 
whether the solution is needed. The authors systematically attended thematic blockchain events to come 
up with the objectives of the solution. 
Design and Development. We iteratively designed and refined our solution based on incoming data. 
Data collection. We conducted a literature review to uncover the blockchain evaluation factors in previous 
research. We searched for peer-reviewed journal articles and conference proceedings (e.g., taxonomies, 
frameworks) on blockchain and related topics (e.g., distributed ledger) to identify important aspects of 
blockchains. We searched with the search string (“blockchain” OR “distributed ledger”) AND (“framework” 
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Figure 1. Methodology of Developing a Framework for Evaluation of Blockchain 
Implementations. Adopted from Peffers et al. (2008) 
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OR “taxonom*” OR “topolog*”) on March 1st, 2018, in title, abstract, and keywords, covering the whole 
period of publications. We read the abstracts of the articles and focused on articles that describe the factors 
for blockchain design and adoption. Next, we performed a backward search to identify relevant 
manuscripts. Further, we systematically updated our search after March 1st, 2018 with a search string 
“blockchain” OR “distributed ledger” for the journals and conferences affiliated by Association of 
Information Systems to follow the rapidly developed blockchain knowledge base. Overall, we identified 
fifty-one conference papers and journal articles relevant to the factors of blockchain implementations and 
DSR tools in the blockchain domain (Appendix A). 
Data Analysis. For data analysis, we applied open coding for initial categorization of blockchain concepts 
and axial coding for removal of overlapping concepts while iteratively testing the concepts against data 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990). If available, we also coded the theoretical foundations that were used to 
delineate and structure interconnections between factors. Next, we aggregated the factors in broader 
categories that were derived from the analysis and counted the number of papers and expert statements on 
the blockchain evaluation factors and their interconnections (Appendix A). Interconnections between 
concepts were identified based on the semantic influence of one concept on another found in the scientific 
texts from the literature review. Interconnections reported in scientific texts and interviews were coded 
along with descriptive information, such as the text excerpts from which interconnections were derived. 
One researcher coded the sources twice in Spring/Summer 2018 and Winter/Spring 2019 for the initial 
coding and validation of the results (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Disputes were resolved in discussions. 
Finally, we translated the data into a framework for evaluation of blockchain implementations by 
semantically grouping the factors in four categories—blockchain innovation, blockchain design, inter-
organizational integration, and implementation environment. The groups arose in semantic similarities 
and are based on related artifacts (Notheisen, Hawlitschek, et al., 2017). Afterwards, the four categories 
were aligned with four main evaluation steps that guide the evaluation of blockchain implementations. 
Demonstration. We demonstrated the developed framework during the scientific conferences, 
consortiums, and other thematic events with a blockchain-friendly audience. 
Evaluation. To evaluate our results, we conducted a first set of interviews (seven semistructured 
interviews) in April and May 2018. We searched for experts in different fields including computer science, 
finance, and social sciences because our results cover broad aspects of blockchains. Interviews were held 
face-to-face, via Skype, and via telephone and lasted on average 74 minutes. Interviewees have an average 
work experience of eight years and were on average engaged in three blockchain projects. We used the 
interview guide. We initially discussed with interviewees the factors suitable for evaluation of blockchain 
implementations and, then, we showed the first versions of the developed framework. The interviewers 
followed the framework while consequently discussing the proposed blockchain evaluation factors and their 
interconnection. The interviews were transcribed and coded using NVivo software. Overall, we gathered 
ninety-eight pages of interview transcriptions. 
After, we revised the framework according to the interviews and the new literature. Therefore, we asked the 
same experts for the phone or e-mail feedback on the new versions. All experts provided the feedback. 
Communication. We communicated the developed framework back to the knowledge base by showing 
the applicability of the framework on a randomly chosen blockchain implementation. Randomization 
ensures a generalized abstraction of the framework, which should evaluate any blockchain implementation. 
For these purposes, we had a hat with the titles of known blockchain projects. The first author took out the 
piece of paper, which stated: “the Brooklyn Microgrid” (Albrecht et al., 2018; Lacity, 2018; Mengelkamp et 
al., 2018). Afterwards, we screened the secondary sources of the Brooklyn microgrid project available online 
including the project website, published scientific papers, and other sources. Overall, we investigated more 
than 100 pages of the secondary data. 
A Framework for Evaluation of Blockchain Implementations 
Figure 2 shows a framework for evaluation of blockchain implementations. The framework uses the 
requirements of the implementations as an input to provide users with an evaluation of blockchain 
implementations as an output. The framework does so by guiding the user through four steps: blockchain 
innovation, blockchain design, inter-organizational integration, and implementation environment. 
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Blockchain Innovation 
First, an estimation of the blockchain suitability to implementations is required. The category blockchain 
suitability includes six factors that represent benefits or challenges for the specific blockchain 
implementations. 
Integrity ensures that information is protected from unauthorized modifications, that is, its original state 
is preserved (Wüst and Gervais, 2017). Implementations can benefit from data integrity of blockchains to 
audit the validity and prove the immutability of an entire history of transactions that are consistent between 
nodes in the network (Glaser, 2017). Increased network protection against fraud is achieved through the 
removal of any central point of failure and increasing the number of nodes. To be attacked, a malicious 
actor requires 51% of the network power (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016), which is difficult to achieve in large 
networks with a high number of competitive nodes. Immutability of the ledger can support 
implementations that require storage of data off-chain (e.g., to verify that data in a cloud remains 
unchanged). However, there is a number of ways to manipulate blockchains, for example, using arbitrage 
bots, who exploit inefficiencies in decentralized networks, paying high transaction fees, and optimizing 
network latency (Daian et al., 2019). 
Blockchains can provide trust in a network of selfish and possibly corrupt agents by replacing any central 
managing point with cryptographic proofs (Nakamoto, 2008). Smart contracts provide additional 
functionality to blockchain transactions by ensuring that pre-defined agreements between users are kept 
without the need of intermediaries (e.g., lawyers). Smart contracts can be useful to enforce policies, for 
example, “triggering smart contracts that prevent everyone from sharing a damaging file” (I2).  
Availability measures as the probability of a system to be accessed when needed (Xu et al., 2017). In blockchain 
systems, availability is offered through data replication across nodes (Wüst and Gervais, 2017) that decreases 
“the probability that every node is shut off and the data is gone” (I7). In centralized systems, availability is 
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Figure 2. A Framework for Evaluation of Blockchain Implementations 
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generally achieved through replication on different physical servers and backups, which is a more expensive 
solution for most implementations (Wüst and Gervais, 2017). 
Blockchain execution relies on transaction costs (or fees) in the form of tokens that represent internet-
based value (Glaser and Bezzenberger, 2015) to reward nodes for the processing of transactions. Token 
commoditization refers to mapping tokens with assets so that blockchain transactions may be used in a 
variety of different contexts. If tokens are not used as assets, there is no common language to integrate 
blockchains into organizational workflows and with other systems (I5). There are two predominant types 
of tokens that have different levels of commoditization: equity tokens and utility tokens. Equity tokens are 
in the form of coins (e.g., Bitcoin) and aim for high commoditization. Utility tokens are not monetized and 
represent more specific assets (e.g., parts of a company). As blockchains operate in closed networks (Glaser, 
2017), tokens are subject to the volatility of costs because token (e.g., cryptocurrency) markets can change 
fast and dramatically. In addition, one should have the possibility to withdraw tokens from the system.  
Scalability refers to the ability of blockchains to handle an increasing amount of workload. The network 
size of blockchains needs to be scalable enough to satisfy the demands of the implementation environment. 
For example, blockchains for electronic medical records should scale to allow all stakeholders to participate 
in the blockchain-based information exchange. Throughput is the number of transactions that can be 
successfully delivered and validated over the network in a fixed period of time (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016). 
When the frequency of transactions in blockchain increases, the throughput of the blockchain network 
needs to be capable of validating submitted transactions with minimum latency. Transaction size 
represents the amount of data stored in a single transaction. The number of transactions included in each 
block is limited by the bandwidth of nodes participating in the network (e.g., bandwidth per Bitcoin block 
is one megabyte) and the defined block size (for Bitcoin, on average 500 transactions in one block) (Xu et 
al., 2017). Latency is the time between submission and secure integration of a transaction into a blockchain 
after a certain number of subsequent blocks. For Bitcoin, latency is near one hour with a 10-minute block 
interval and confirmation after 6 blocks; for Ethereum, it is close to three minutes with a 14-second block 
interval and confirmation after 12 blocks (Xu et al., 2017). 
Confidentiality is defined as the protection of information from unintended disclosure. Data encryption 
provides for confidentiality on blockchains. For example, in the Bitcoin network, all transactions are 
publicly visible and user confidentiality can be damaged. Though, Monero and Zcash employ advanced 
cryptographic constructions to protect the confidentiality of users. 
Blockchain Design 
Blockchain designs aim to minimize losses and maximize benefits of blockchains according to project 
requirements. The first and main factor is the consensus mechanism which ensures that only valid and 
unique transactions are added to blockchains (Walsh et al., 2016). There are three predominant consensus 
mechanisms. Proof-of-work requires resources from a miner (e.g., processing time) to produce a 
computationally difficult piece of data. (Delegated) proof-of-stake distributes the ability to create a new 
block depending on user’s stake in the system. Practical Byzantine fault tolerance gathers individual 
decisions made by trusted nodes in a network that together determine system-level agreements. “This 
consensus part is the hardest one when design blockchain because that will impact everything else. You 
make the ground decision here with respect to the consensus mechanism, and it is hard to change it later. 
The right choice of consensus is to move from thinking about design to thinking about implementation” 
(I2). 
The anonymity of users assesses with what accuracy users can be matched to particular identities. For 
example, users are pseudonymous in case of Bitcoin and anonymous in case of Zcash, while in business 
blockchain networks users are often identifiable (e.g., Hyperledger). The anonymity of users is considered 
according to project requirements. “If you are thinking about existing blockchains for clinical data, they 
favor anonymity. But if you are thinking in terms of a pharmaceutical company, you need to de-anonymize 
users at some point” (I2). 
Transparency represents whether information of or data on blockchains can be accessible (Yli-Huumo et 
al., 2016). The transparency of the blockchain network provides a degree of control to end-users with 
regard to the software they run. In some scenarios, involved processors can operate as black boxes and do 
not reveal the way they came to specific results (e.g., Oracles): the operations are processed off-chain and 
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the outcomes are published on-chains. However, this contradicts the original understanding of how 
blockchains function. Transparency of transactions represents a degree of openness of data on 
blockchains. Public blockchains have no restrictions on reading blockchain data; private blockchains limit 
access to blockchain data to predefined users (Walsh et al., 2016). If the transparency of transactions is 
public, anyone can extract the transaction history and retrieve sensitive information (Walsh et al., 2016). 
For example, for sharing economies, transparency can predict signals and, therefore, predict the economy; 
for “clinical records, the transparency is harmful because one has to comply with the law first” (I2). 
Permissioning identifies whether all users can participate in the network or the participation is restricted 
to a small community. Permissioned blockchains restrict transaction processing to predefined nodes, while 
permissionless blockchains have no restrictions on identities of validating nodes (Walsh et al., 2016). For 
implementations, differences arise when the solutions target external communication with customers (e.g., 
online services) or blockchains are used to manage inter- and intra-organizational processes (e.g., supply 
chain management). 
The modularity of blockchains may be necessary to separate different types of transactions stored on a 
blockchain to reduce the complexity of the system or improve scalability. Side-chains enable assets to be 
transferred between multiple blockchains. This gives users access to new systems using the assets they 
already own (Xu et al., 2017). By reusing assets, these systems can interoperate with each other, avoiding 
liquidity shortages and market fluctuations. Some data should not be stored on blockchains and during the 
project on-chain-off-chain decisions should be made. To support off-chain decisions, other storage systems 
are needed (e.g., interplanetary file system). For mobile devices, the concept of lightweight nodes versus 
full nodes can be considered. Full nodes have a copy of the whole transaction history and this history must 
be downloaded. Lightweight nodes verify transactions using simplified payment verification methods that 
download only the headers of all blocks on the blockchain. Full nodes support lightweight nodes by allowing 
them to connect and transmit transactions to the network and by notifying lightweight nodes when a 
transaction affects them. 
Inter-Organizational Integration 
Inter-organizational governance assesses whether blockchain capabilities enhance inter-
organizational competitiveness (Beck et al., 2018). Vision, strategies, and tactics can differ for or be 
influenced by blockchains because of its inter-organizational nature. For example, open-source strategies 
require granting universal access to development rights. Business value depends on specific use cases. 
Other project-specific characteristics (e.g., project size) can influence blockchain adoption. It is necessary 
to consider switching costs that accrue through blockchain adoption. However, these research directions 
are in their infancy and attention should be focused on how governance is different for or influenced by 
blockchains versus other IT solutions. 
Interactions of users are at the core of blockchains, and user adoption of blockchains requires attention. 
“I think, the organizational impact is just the social structure of people, who produce value” (I1). User 
adoption is driven by the hype around blockchains and ignorance in terms of technical knowledge and 
implications that blockchains might have. “In the future people will start to realize that blockchain was a 
good idea for some things whether a very bad idea for all the other things, like Facebook” (I1). User adoption 
of blockchains can depend on usability (quality of being easy to use to fulfill a specified task effectively), 
which is currently still an issue for blockchains. For example, the Bitcoin API for developing services is 
difficult to use (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016). Technology acceptance and related constructs, such as ease of use 
and usefulness, cultural and age differences, as well as concepts from the broader adoption literature, such 
as technology acceptance theory and unified technology acceptance theory, can provide additional insights 
to assess user adoption. An important question is whether extant theories on user adoption will also hold 
for blockchain technologies. 
Interoperability is defined as interoperability between blockchains, and interoperability of blockchains 
with other systems. Interoperability between blockchains is tightly coupled with interoperability of tokens. 
A blockchain platform (e.g., Ethereum) that uses its own currency makes it hard to be interoperable with 
other platforms. If one is in a blockchain network and uses its tokens, it inflates the value of the tokens. 
“The worst thing that can happen in five years that only Ethereum is used because the whole point of 
blockchain is no single central point and it is caused failure” (I2). Interoperability between blockchains 
and other systems should emerge naturally when you comply with data standards. 
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Implementation Environment 
Blockchains should comply with regulations and other requirements in the implementation environment. 
Compliance of blockchains with current regulations is the greatest barrier. Data standards have not yet 
been proposed to deal with blockchains. “I think that governments and regulators, in general, are very far 
behind in terms of data on blockchains and data market-driven economies” (I2). An issue seen with 
blockchains is that it has a cryptographic layer which may allow for obfuscation of actions that happen on 
blockchains. Only several governments have imposed regulations of blockchains, for example, in Singapore, 
China, Japan, and South Korea regulations of cryptocurrency markets were implemented. 
Ecosystem-specific requirements may lead to differences in blockchain suitability of markets and 
industries. Ecosystem self-sufficiency characterizes closed systems where value exchanges happen without 
external interactions (Glaser, 2017). To achieve high ecosystem self-sufficiency, cooperation of customers 
and value providers within an ecosystem is required. Institutionalization captures to what degree 
blockchains are embedded in social structures, for instance, who issues the value (e.g., central banks or 
community currency issuers). “In some cases, you need to have a closed blockchain, for instance, Fedcoin, 
if federal states decide to launch coins on their own to bypass banks and skip up some taxes” (I2). Other 
economic constraints including the potential to disrupt an industry or to distribute market power and 
competitive pressure can be considered together with related theories (e.g., theories of competition and 
market performance) to further inform blockchain implementations. 
Selected Interconnections between the Factors 
Developers and blockchain integrators also need to consider interconnections between the factors while 
evaluating blockchain implementations. We found 48 interconnections between factors, however, we only 
discussed those which were mentioned more than two times. Overall, trade-offs between all factors should 
be considered specifically for each implementation. 
Consensus mechanism, modularity  integrity, scalability: the consensus mechanism is closely 
related to integrity and scalability issues, and an estimation of their trade-offs is necessary. Different 
consensus mechanisms have different latencies associated with transaction confirmations (Walsh et al., 
2016) and need to arrange transaction speed against an appropriate level of integrity (Risius and Spohrer, 
2017; Xu et al., 2017). Blockchains are not suitable for high-frequency transactions but ensure high data 
integrity when proof-of-work is used as a consensus mechanism (Albrecht et al., 2018). However, 
blockchains with consensus mechanisms such as proof-of-stake and practical Byzantine fault tolerance 
achieve higher scalability but are less secure regarding unauthorized modifications of data. The usage of 
multiple, connected blockchains improves scalability (e.g., sharding). Multiple chains are used for specific 
tasks and types of transactions, where all chains are linked with the main blockchain. These multiple chains 
can build a blockchain ecosystem based on the main blockchain to reduce transaction load on the main 
chain (Xu et al., 2017). However, “if we put more data on-chain, the integrity of data would increase” (I5). 
Consensus mechanism  anonymity  transparency  permissioning: there are trade-offs 
between these four factors of blockchain design. Whereas 96% of permissionless blockchains use proof-of-
work or proof-of-stake consensus mechanisms (Salviotti, Rossi and Abbatemarco, 2018), permissioned 
blockchains generally use lightweight consensus mechanisms, for example, practical Byzantine fault 
tolerance (Risius and Spohrer, 2017; Salviotti et al., 2018). In permissionless and public networks, users act 
under pseudonyms or are anonymous, while in permissioned and private networks all users are identified 
(Notheisen, Hawlitschek, et al., 2017; Salviotti et al., 2018). In permissionless blockchains all transactions 
are publicly viewable, creating full transparency of the network; permissioned blockchains can sacrifice 
transparency of information (Risius and Spohrer, 2017; Albrecht et al., 2018). 
User adoption  confidentiality, integrity, transaction costs, scalability: the fear of being 
identifiable and linked to transactions in a fully transparent network keeps users from adopting 
blockchains. Information about integrity breaches of blockchains (e.g., money losses) can prevent adoption 
because in most cases “people trust in blockchain by itself” (I5) without an understanding of the technical 
functioning. Integrity-related issues could also be moderated by cultural or age-related differences (Risius 
and Spohrer, 2017). If data integrity is not strong, then people will be less inclined to adopt blockchains, “if 
it is kind of secure this increases the user acceptance” (I3). Costs and volatility in the transaction currency 
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can constrain the adoption and utilization (Risius and Spohrer, 2017). Scalability issues (e.g., latency) can 
constrain the blockchain utilization and determine end-user adoption (Risius and Spohrer, 2017). 
Confidentiality  transparency: confidentiality is connected to transparency in a way that the more 
data transparency exists, the less confidentiality of users can be guaranteed (I2, I8). A fully transparent 
system allows anyone to see data on blockchain and no confidentiality is provided. Otherwise, a fully private 
system provides no transparency. However, a system can still provide significant confidentiality-guarantees 
while making processes of state transitions transparent. For example, a distributed ledger can provide 
public verifiability of its overall state without leaking information about the state of each individual 
participant. Confidentiality in a public system can be achieved using cryptographic techniques but typically 
comes at the cost of lower efficiency (Wüst and Gervais, 2017). Non-transparent data on blockchains is 
necessary to protect confidential information. For example, confidentiality issues in Bitcoin blockchain led 
to the development of Zcash, a cryptocurrency that encrypts all data on transactions including transaction 
value. 
Regulations  interoperability: to exchange data between systems, it is necessary to consider 
compatibility and network externalities and use the same formats and semantics. “I do not think that the 
interoperability is an issue right now; also, I do not think that blockchains force to use data standards as 
much as possible. In the near future, the interoperability will emerge from the use cases affecting data 
standards” (I2). 
Applicability of the Framework: the Brooklyn Microgrid 
The Brooklyn Microgrid is a project of LO3 Energy startup that develops a blockchain-based microgrid 
energy market in Brooklyn, New York. The project aims to enable network members to trade locally 
generated energy with the neighbors in a peer-to-peer manner (Lacity, 2018).  
Blockchain innovation. First, a blockchain-based microgrid energy market benefits from eliminating 
trusted third parties, centralized utility companies that manage energy platforms. Therefore, the usage of 
blockchain technology for electricity transactions makes microgrids more efficient by creating trust 
between the involved agents (Mengelkamp et al., 2018). Second, the Brooklyn area is vulnerable to grid 
failures caused by repetitive natural disasters. The decentralized infrastructure of blockchain allows a local 
microgrid to be available if the main utility grid is offline “so you have a safe place to charge your phone, 
get food or send out emails to let people know you are okay” (Lacity, 2018, p. 203). 
Despite the envisioned benefits, blockchain systems are energy-consuming in case of transaction costs that 
contradicts the sustainability principles of microgrid energy markets (Mengelkamp et al., 2018). Besides, 
the developed blockchain-based prototype has a dissatisfactory low transaction speed, i.e., scalability 
(Lacity, 2018). 
The factors of integrity and confidentiality were not clearly discussed in the available sources of the 
Brooklyn microgrid project. We assume that these factors have secondary importance. However, in other 
literature on peer-to-peer energy trading, the integrity of transactions and confidentiality of users in the 
blockchain network is better comparing to centralized trading platforms (Mengelkamp et al., 2018). 
Blockchain design. To provide decentralized infrastructure with high availability, LO3 Energy’s first proof-
of-concept was based on a standard Ethereum blockchain (Lacity, 2018). Ethereum blockchain is a public 
permissionless blockchain that utilizes proof-of-work or proof-of-stake to reach consensus on the system 
updates and allows for pseudonymous users in the network. 
Inter-organizational integration. Decentralized blockchain inter-organizational governance is suitable for 
ensuring a reliable balance of energy generation and consumption in the microgrid network (Mengelkamp 
et al., 2018). Moreover, the Brooklyn Microgrid’s business model is characterized by a closed ecosystem 
that generates value inside of the community (Glaser, 2017). Because users can keep profits from energy 
trading within the community, the adoption of the network by market participants happens in a user-
friendly and comprehensive way (Mengelkamp et al., 2018). Regarding interoperability, a secure 
connection from the market participants’ energy devices and blockchain is necessary. Also, interoperability 
between the main physical grid and blockchain-based virtual microgrid should be established. Because 
energy is a physical good, energy flow problems might arise during the transmission on constrained grids 
(Mengelkamp et al., 2018). 
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Implementation environment. Current regulations of the energy sector do not allow to run local peer-to-
peer energy markets in most countries and, hence, is the biggest bottleneck (Lacity, 2018; Mengelkamp et 
al., 2018). The Brooklyn Microgrid project in cooperation with Con Edison, Inc. is working on the 
legalization of a peer-to-peer local microgrid energy trading (Mengelkamp et al., 2018). Other ecosystem-
specific requirements concern a lack of ability of existing wholesale markets to react in real-time to the 
volatile and intermittent generation from decentralized microgrids. Furthermore, market prices are often 
determined on a national level which does not reflect balancing demand and supply of local energy 
(Mengelkamp et al., 2018). 
Interconnections. Instead of using computationally costly consensus, identity mechanisms use the simple 
verification of the agent’s identity mechanisms (consensus mechanism, anonymity  transaction costs). 
If only trusted community members participate in the market, an identity-based consensus mechanism can 
be sufficiently secure (consensus mechanism  anonymity). Self-interested rational market participants 
maximize their revenue and minimize their energy costs (user adoption  transaction costs). There is no 
specific information about interconnections confidentiality  transparency and regulations   
interoperability because the confidentiality of users was not mentioned as important factor and regulations 
of the energy sector are not supported peer-to-peer energy trading to consider the specific effect on 
interoperability. 
Evaluation outcome. The evaluation shows that the Brooklyn Microgrid project benefits from blockchain 
by establishing trust without centralized utility companies and increased availability of the network. 
Therefore, an Ethereum public permissionless blockchain satisfies these requirements. However, the 
Ethereum blockchain has challenges such as transaction costs and scalability of the network because of 
employed proof-of-work consensus mechanism. Further, inter-organizational integration of blockchain 
supports decentralized governance of the peer-to-peer local energy trading together with closed value 
generation of the business model. Thus, users are motivated to participate in the network. However, the 
interoperability of the users’ devices with blockchain and the blockchain with the main physical grid is 
challenging. The main bottleneck is regulations that do not allow to trade energy on the local markets. 
Therefore, computationally efficient blockchains with different consensus mechanism should be more 
suitable to maximize performance metrics of adopting blockchains (Mengelkamp et al., 2018). Also, 
regulations should be developed on the national and inter-national levels.  
Discussion 
The framework for evaluation of blockchain implementations comprises factors that are important to 
consider before blockchain projects begin. Factors are grouped in four semantic categories blockchain 
suitability, blockchain design, inter-organizational integration, and implementation environment. First, the 
benefits of implementing blockchains—integrity, trust, and availability—and challenges—transaction costs, 
scalability, and confidentiality—should be estimated and contrasted with project requirements. Second, five 
blockchain design components—consensus mechanism, anonymity, transparency, permissioning, and 
modularity—can be combined into diverse blockchain designs to maximize benefits and minimize 
challenges. Third, blockchain-based systems need to be integrated into organizational processes, which 
requires consideration of governance, user adoption, and interoperability of blockchains and other 
information systems. Fourth, blockchains should fit into their implementation environment including 
compliance with regulations and other ecosystem-specific requirements (e.g., competitive pressure).  
This research contributes to the scientific knowledge base in four ways. First, previous research on 
blockchain proposes computer-science (Glaser and Bezzenberger, 2015; Walsh et al., 2016), user-related, 
and organization-related factors (Glaser, 2017; Salviotti et al., 2018) but falls short in considering their 
mutual impact. Our study complements previous research by offering clear conceptualizations for the 
identified blockchain evaluation factors and their interconnections. The identified factors bridge the gap 
between extant technology-centered and organizational-focused research on blockchains and serve as a 
foundation for the further synthesis of the findings. Second, we proposed an integrative framework for 
evaluation of blockchain implementations. The framework synthesizes expert insights about the 
development of blockchain-based systems and their implementation in organizational and environmental 
contexts. Third, the overview of extant research can accelerate future conceptual studies on blockchain 
adoption (e.g., case studies, expert interviews, and Delphi studies) in different industries that may identify 
new interconnections between factors not addressed in extant literature. Fourth, further analysis of 
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theoretical and empirical findings in different industries will allow for the development of blockchain 
measurements and performance indicators, which will be useful to reduce the prevailing uncertainty about 
the business value of blockchains. 
Our research contributes to practice by providing a comprehensive combination of factors that can 
influence the outcomes of implementations. We have proposed an integrative framework to evaluate 
blockchain implementations that is useful for practitioners to gain knowledge about the main factors before 
the projects begin. For example, our manuscript highlights other blockchain designs, besides the widely-
known public blockchains, that are useful if public blockchains are unfeasible. For many projects, 
businesses should consider the implementation of private blockchains that store information more 
predictable and confidential than public blockchains. Private blockchains lose the advantages of completely 
decentralized networks; still, they keep up-to-date data with an immutable history of changes that is 
available for all members of the network. Moreover, the framework can support project management by 
providing insights on the required expertise of project teams and purposeful key performance indicators of 
blockchain projects. 
This study is not without limitations. First, we focus on blockchains as one type of a distributed ledger where 
the continuous transaction history is kept in blocks. Other types of distributed ledgers, for example, directed 
acyclic graphs (IOTA) are out of the scope of the manuscript. Second, we do not go into technical specifics 
with respect to blockchain factors. For example, our discussion of integrity could go into more details on 
cryptographic algorithms. Cryptographic algorithms also should be exchanged or strengthened with 
increasing processing power available to attackers or as soon as exploits are discovered. However, this 
seems appropriate as our goal was to provide a holistic overview of factors that can guide projects, which 
consider blockchain adoptions. 
Future research could replicate our research approach with additional scientific or industry data to falsify 
or corroborate our findings. The identification of additional blockchain evaluation factors would broaden 
the applicability of the developed framework. Further, future research could elaborate the proposed 
concepts for the specific industries, markets, and countries. Studies in different industry contexts would 
allow to development of measurements and performance indicators that are pertinent for blockchain 
systems. This, in turn, would reduce the existing uncertainty about the real business value of blockchain 
systems (Notheisen, Hawlitschek, et al., 2017). 
Conclusion 
Blockchain is an emerging technology with largely untapped potential. Currently, knowledge of blockchain 
remains largely disparate, which hinders the integration of blockchain-based systems into organizations. 
Our work consolidates research on technical, inter-organizational, and environmental perspectives of 
blockchain in the form of a framework for evaluation of blockchain implementations. The framework 
accounts for blockchain evaluation factors that are grouped into four categories, blockchain suitability, 
blockchain design, inter-organizational integration, and implementation environment. This research 
contributes to the scientific knowledge base by synthesizing information on blockchain evaluation factors 
and highlighting their interconnections. It complements the scientific literature on blockchain 
classifications and blockchain integration frameworks, i.e., DSR in the blockchain domain. Overall, the 
framework for evaluation of blockchain implementations captures the current state of knowledge on 
blockchain aspects and their interconnections; simultaneously, it serves as a foundation for future 
theoretical and empirical research exploring how to integrate blockchain into industries and markets.  
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Andersen & Bogusz, 2017 X  X     X              
Beck & Müller-Bloch, 2017 X X  X X    X X  X   X       
Beck et al., 2016 X X X X X  X  X X X  X X   X     
Beck, Müller-Bloch & King, 
2018 X X X      X X  X          
Beinke & Ngoc, 2018 X X X X X       X          
Bonneau et al., 2015 X  X X X X X X       X       
Brenig, Schwarz & 
Rückeshäuser, 2016 X X  X    X    X X         
Chanson, Risius & 
Wortmann, 2018  X  X    X       X       
Ciriello, Beck and Thatcher, 
2018 X X X X  X X X X X  X X  X X  X  X  
Diniz et al., 2016  X  X X    X X  X X X X       
Elsman et al., 2017 X X X X X X X X X X     X X X X    
Fridgen, Lockl, et al., 2018 X  X         X    X      
Fridgen, Schweizer et al., 
2018  X X X X       X X X X X     X 
Fridgen et al., 2018 X X X X X    X X    X X X     X 
Friedlmaier, Tumasjan & 
Welpe, 2016 X X X X X  X  X X  X  X X       
Glaser, 2017  X X X X  X   X  X X  X X      
Glaser & Bezzenberger,2015 X X  X X  X X       X X      
Hawlitschek, Notheisen & 
Teubner, 2018 X X X X X X X X X X  X  X X X X X    
Holotiuk& Moormann,2018  X  X X X      X X  X   X    
Hua et al., 2018 X X X X X X X X X X       X X    
Hyvärinen et al., 2017 X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X  X    
Kaul, Storey & Woo, 2018 X X X   X X  X   X   X       
Kazan et al., 2014 X        X   X X         
Lacity, 2018 X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X  X    
Li et al., 2018 X X X  X   X  X   X  X       
Mendling et al., 2018 X X                    
 Towards a Framework for Evaluation of Blockchain Implementations 
  
 Fortieth International Conference on Information Systems, Munich 2019 16 
Mendling et al., 2017 X X X X X X X X    X X X X X  X    
Morisse, 2015 X    X  X X X X   X         
Moyano and Ross, 2017 X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X X    
Naerland et al., 2017 X X X X X X X X X X  X X    X X    
Nofer et al., 2017 X X X X X X X X X X  X X   X  X    
Notheisen et al., 2017 X X X X X X X X X X  X X  X X  X    
Notheisen, Cholewa & 
Shanmugam, 2017 X X X X X X X X X X X     X X X    
Oliveira et al., 2018 X X     X  X X  X X    X     
Rückeshäuser, 2017 X  X X X  X  X X  X    X X X    
Risius & Spohrer, 2017 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X X X  X 
Sadhya & Sadhya, 2018 X X X X X X X X X   X X  X X      
Salviotti, Rossi & 
Abbatemarco, 2018 X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X X    
Scholz & Stein, 2018 X X X X X X X X X X  X  X X X X X  X  
Schlegel, Zavolokina & 
Schwabe, 2018 X X X X X  X X     X  X       
Schweizer et al., 2017 X X X X X X X X X X   X  X X X X    
Seebacher, 2018 X X X   X X X X X  X X   X X     
Tönnissen&Teuteberg,2018 X X X X  X  X       X X      
Tschorsch & Scheuermann, 
2016 X  X X X X X X              
Walsh et al., 2016 X  X  X  X X X X X X  X X       
Wang, Luo & Xue, 2018 X X X X X  X     X X         
Wörner et al., 2016 X X X X   X X X X X X X X X X      
Xu et al., 2017 X X X X X X X X X X X X  X X  X X    
Yli-Huumo et al., 2016 X X X X X X X X  X  X X         
Ziolkowski et al., 2018 X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X X X   
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Interviewee 1  X      X   X X X X X  X     
Interviewee 2 X  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Interviewee 3 X X X  X  X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Interviewee 4 X X         X X  X        
Interviewee 5 X X X X X X     X X  X  X X X X X X 
Interviewee 6 X  X X X  X  X X  X X  X  X X    
Interviewee 7 X  X X X X X X X X X  X X X X  X X X  
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Appendix A. A Factor Matrix. 
 
